Law and the Moral Dynamics of Collective Action
Aditi Bagchi*
Many moral demands on social groups cannot be met without cooperation
among group members. In some cases, individual action does not advance the
collective moral interest at all without some threshold level of cooperation by other
group members. Is an individual required to act as if others will cooperate even
if she knows that they will not? This Article argues that individuals may take
into account the reality of pervasive noncooperation and decline to attempt
cooperation. Only ex ante mandatory rules can solve moral collective action
problems. In a political community, those rules are public law.
The most compelling argument in favor of recognizing individual duties
to attempt cooperation is that we may not predict that other people will fail to
comply with their moral duties. A variety of legal rules reveal discomfort with
such “agent predictions” in the context of criminal law, tort law, and First
Amendment law. This Article will show, however, that legal shifts in several
doctrinal areas, especially tort law, not only tolerate but, in some cases, appear
to require that individuals make agent predictions. This trend is consistent with
contemporary thinking about how people relate to contingent features of our
environment. This Article will parse out permissible and impermissible agent
predictions.
The agent predictions at issue in moral collective action problems are
usually permissible. This Article articulates and defends a “no-martyr
principle” that denies a duty to (attempt to) contribute to collective endeavors
that are futile in the light of sound agent predictions. While such conduct is
virtuous, it is not compulsory. Private law rules (in tort and contract law)
largely respect the no-martyr principle. This Article shows how public law gets
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around it and why we should use mandatory rules issued by the state rather
than moral exhortation of individuals to solve moral collective action problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
A group of three-year-olds is told that if they form a line by 1:00
p.m., they will be taken to the playground for recess. Although all the
children would rather play on the playground than in the classroom,
most of them run around the room. You are a sober and precocious
child in their midst. It is apparent that your class will not go to the
playground. Should you stand quietly in a position that could be part
of a line should others care to form one?
No, you should not. The rational course is to maximize your fun
given the facts as you find them—unless you have the means to solve
the collective action problem. What if the collective ambition is not
fun but moral compliance? Instead of forming a line for recess,
imagine a community of adults understands that only if at least a
quarter of them march in protest of an unjust regime can they expect
the government to alter its course. Assume for now that you know that
there will be no change in governance unless the 25 percent threshold
is met, and you are confident that it will not be met. Do you have a
duty to march? Put aside certain reasons that you might have for
marching such as interests in self-expression and solidarity. Must you
march in order to bring down the unjust regime? Like the sober
preschooler, you lack the capacity to bring about the desired end. Your
action will make no difference to the collective outcome. The
outcome in this scenario, however, is a collective wrong, not merely a
collective disappointment.
I will argue that you have no duty to march on these facts. More
generally, we have no duty to perform actions in service of collective
ends when we know our individual actions will be futile.1 The collective
duty to promote justice, or avert the course of an unjust regime, does
not evaporate in the face of collective inaction. It often generates
reasons to do something different, something more fruitful. But a
collective duty cannot ground an individual duty to act if individual
action will not contribute to fulfillment of the underlying collective
1

This Article does not address the question of how much we should contribute
when we can make an individual difference to the collective end. Cf. Liam B. Murphy,
The Demands of Beneficence, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 267 (1993). I explore here only the
scenario where compliance by numerous people is required to meet moral demands
on the collective, and individuals cannot make a difference without a threshold level
of compliance by others.
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duty, even if that action would have been the optimal course had
others cooperated. The content of our moral duties turns on facts as
we find them. Some of those facts justify beliefs about how other
people will behave. I will argue that we are entitled to make sound
predictions about whether the people around us will comply with
moral duties, and especially whether the people around us will
conform to a rule of conduct that would secure a collectively desired
end. Unruly preschoolers and unduly passive citizens are both facts
for purposes of individual deliberation.
The same principle is at work outside the grand stage of politics.
An employee may not be obligated to resign in protest when her
employer engages in some act of discrimination or fires another
employee for expressing irritation with her boss, and the act is not
illegal under current law. It might be that mass employee departures
would turn heads but resigning alone will change nothing. The
employee’s reason for leaving will be filed away and discarded when
files are cleared after five years. It will not help the mistreated
employee nor prevent the company from mistreating others. She
might choose to resign nevertheless in order to show her disapproval
to friends and family.2 She might choose to resign to show solidarity
with the mistreated employee or because she does not want to work at
a company that treats its employees badly. But it is not a matter of
keeping her conscience clear because she has no duty to resign.
In a still smaller way, a person that realizes her neighborhood
listserv is racist might not be required to unsubscribe from it. The
listserv might be racist because of how it sorts and screens emails or the
advice that is found there.3 But if the person observes that most of the
people on the listserv are happy with it and she consistently gets a
confused or hostile reaction when she raises her concerns in private
conversation with its members, she may have no reasonable
expectation that the listserv will change because she resigns. Maybe
there are other actions she can take, like publicizing the racist nature
of the group and starting an alternative group. But maybe she cannot
because she has agreed to confidentiality, or because disclosure would
2

One might have special reason to disassociate from others through even
ineffectual protest if it is necessary to correct previous actions or social assumptions
that would associate one with the wrongdoers. Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Symbolic Protest and
Calculated Silence, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 83, 90–92 (1979).
3
This hypothetical is loosely inspired by Taylor Lorenz, Upper East Side Mom Group
Implodes Over Accusations of Racism and Censorship, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/09/style/ues-mommas-facebook-group-racismcensorship.html.
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violate duties of loyalty to particular members, or because too few
people in the neighborhood would join the alternative group. If
leaving the group alone cannot be expected to effectuate any change,
the person is not obligated to unsubscribe and forego its informational
benefits.
This is not an easy conclusion at which to arrive. Even if we agree
in principle that we cannot be required to try if we are bound to fail
(on which, in fact, we will not all agree4), we might not agree on
whether we can ever “know” that attempting to contribute to collective
action is futile. It requires predicting that fellow citizens will not
march; co-workers will not resign; neighbors will not unsubscribe. Few
of us might directly take the position that we can never predict the
behavior of others, but there are strong philosophical arguments in
favor of refraining from acting on such predictions.
Our collective moral uncertainty on these questions is reflected in
law. There are some doctrines that seem to entitle us to act as if we
have no idea what others will do—doctrines that would seem to protect
speech that promotes violence, or tort doctrines that protect
manufacturers of dangerous goods, or those who provide prospective
drivers with excess alcohol. While many of these doctrines have come
under pressure and some have been revised in recent years, there
remains a strong resistance to requiring people to act as if they know
what other people will do. Indeed, there are places in the law—
especially criminal law—where we are rightly and fiercely committed
to the assumption that the future conduct of others is unknowable.
Nevertheless, I will suggest in Part II that we are increasingly unwilling
to categorically deny the predictability of other people in the context
of moral deliberation. At issue is not whether we may ever predict what
other people will do, as when choosing to walk on the left or right side
of the sidewalk. My question is whether our duties to others depend on
those predictions and, in particular, whether such predictions can
lighten our duties to others. What I will call agent predictions are
sometimes appropriate, and sometimes not.
Once I have shown that we are entitled, under certain conditions,
to take into account sound predictions about the behavior of other
agents, in the remainder of Part II, I will defend a no-martyr principle
that denies a categorical duty to act according to a maxim that would
be desirable if, and only if, others abide by it when we know that others
will not. There is no general rule that actions are only required if they

4

See infra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.
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“make a difference.” We are obligated to tell the truth and keep our
promises, for example, even if truth-telling or promise-keeping in a
given case does not achieve anything tangible. Telling the truth and
keeping promises are morally valuable in themselves.5 But the
individual duty of cooperation to advance a collective moral objective
is a derivative duty—it operates in service of a collective duty. So,
unlike other duties, including the duty of fair play,6 an individual duty
to serve collective justice depends on the prospects for making a
difference.
The no-martyr principle is a moral principle, but it finds traction
in several doctrines of common law-private law. Most fundamentally,
defendants are usually only liable for the actual harms they have
caused. Hypothetical injuries that might have flowed from their
actions in other states of the world are not enough. The defendant’s
conduct must usually have been a but-for cause of the plaintiff’s injury
in order for the defendant to be held responsible.7 More specific
doctrines illustrate the principle at work in the weeds. Our obligations
to perform in contract are dependent on performance by the other
party, where the other party’s performance is due first. Even where we
are to perform first, we do not have to if we have reasonable basis to
doubt the other will perform when her performance is due and she
does not provide adequate assurance that she will. In tort, courts are
reluctant to hold individuals were subject to standards of conduct to
which others have not adhered, even if such a standard might be a
good idea going forward—sometimes a frustrating position from the

5

Truth-telling and promise-keeping are morally mandatory independent of their
consequences on a deontological view. My point here is that even on a deontological
view, consequences matter to recognition of an individual duty that is derivative of a
collective one, because the individual duty serves the collective one by virtue of what
the individual contributes to the collective enterprise. By contrast, consequences will
always matter to consequentialists. For an overview of the debate between
consequentialists and deontologists, see SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF
CONSEQUENTIALISM 146–47 (1982).
6
The duty of fair play provides that “when a number of persons conduct any joint
enterprise according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted
to these restrictions when required have a right to a similar submission from those who
have benefited by their submission.” H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64
PHIL. REV. 175, 185 (1955).
7
Smith v. Steelcase, Inc., No. 223892, 2001 WL 1545992, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App.
Nov. 30, 2001) (quoting Skinner v. Square D Co., 516 N.W.2d 475, 479 (Mich. 1994))
(“The cause in fact element generally requires a showing that ‘but for’ the defendant’s
actions, the plaintiff’s injury would not have occurred.”).
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standpoint of legal progress.8 Even under the common law, where we
openly authorize them to make law, judges are reluctant to create
obligations that apply retroactively; they aim instead to tether any new
legal norms in existing doctrinal lines and existing social expectations.
The no-martyr principle is both animated and constrained by the
more foundational principle of equality, which I explore in Part III.
On the one hand, I will show that rejecting the no-martyr principle,
especially in law, unfairly imposes heightened obligations on an
arbitrary few. On the other hand, I will argue that we are only entitled
to incorporate predictions about the conduct of others into our
practical reasoning when our predictions comply with an equality
constraint. We can only predict the behavior of other people when
our prediction does not turn on any particular characteristic of those
persons but applies equally to all persons. The more generalized the
assumption we make about human behavior, the more permissible to
act on the basis of that assumption. So, we can assume that many
people will drive over the speed limit when we regulate the highways,
but neither individuals nor the state may act on any predictions about
what kinds of people will do this at a higher rate than others.
Even when agent predictions are subject to the equality
constraint, from the standpoint of justice, they are devastating. That
is, justice is not possible, or at least substantially less likely, if everyone
acts in the way I will argue they are entitled to do.9 I will grapple with
these implications in Part IV. First, we should distinguish between
what is morally required and what is morally commendable. We have
the resources to understand why acting in the way that everyone
should—even when they will not—is virtuous without characterizing
that conduct as morally compulsory. Thus, there is a limit to the
analogy between the protestors and the preschoolers. The preschooler
who stands quietly in the hypothetical line is foolish; the protestor who
marches, notwithstanding apparent futility, is virtuous. Our collective
interest in justice profits from the supererogatory10 conduct of the
virtuous.
Still, the fact that we would be better off if we abided by a
hypothetical moral duty does not make that duty real.11 We have
8

See infra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
That is, justice is not possible absent state action, as discussed infra Part V.
10
Supererogatory acts are praiseworthy actions that go beyond duty. See generally
David Heyd, Obligation and Supererogation, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1915, 1917
(Stephen G. Post ed., 3d ed. 2004) (1995).
11
See infra Part III.B.
9
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precedent for that way of thinking, not least in the moral theory of
Immanuel Kant, and in the political context, we might mistakenly
interpret the methodology of John Rawls to suggest it. But we have
reason to reject this facet of Kant’s moral theory, and we can
distinguish the position of the individual agent deliberating about her
own duties from that of an individual deliberating about the demands
of justice for social institutions. I will rely on the phenomenology12 of
moral decision-making and its essentially individual character to reject
the appealing view that our moral duties must be such that, if we each
complied with them, our world would be just.
On the heels of that unhappy conclusion, I will turn in Part V to
the clear solution to many—but not all—moral collective action
problems, analogous to the solution to ordinary collective action
problems: state action. The remainder of the Article will be devoted
to showing how states can and do solve these problems primarily by
way of public law. The primary advantage of public law over common
law lies in its timing. The publication of generally binding rules gives
us reason to believe that there will be high levels of compliance. But it
also gives us an exclusionary reason13 to comply without worrying (very
much) about whether others will. I suggest that we should look to
mandatory rules rather than appeals to conscience to solve moral
collective action problems in several areas in which we now rely on the
latter, including corporate social responsibility, nondisclosure
agreements, transfers of intellectual property, liability waivers, and
arbitration clauses. I hope to show how taking moral collective action
problems seriously and accepting that individuals are not required to
take futile action in the pursuit of collective justice might translate into
policy. But my aim is also to celebrate the moral wonder of public law.
Because moral collective action problems are rampant, the state as an
issuer of mandatory rules is a precondition of justice.

12
By the phenomenology of individual decision-making, I refer to the subjective,
conscious experience of individuals making choices about how to act and how to live.
See generally DAVID WOODRUFF SMITH, MIND WORLD: ESSAYS IN PHENOMENOLOGY AND
ONTOLOGY 76–121 (2004).
13
An exclusionary reason, such as an authoritative directive, preempts first-order
reasons that would otherwise govern a choice of how to act. See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL
REASON AND NORMS 46 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (1975).
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II. MORAL COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS
Most philosophical discussion of nonideal circumstances,
including my own, has concerned the scope of our obligations when
social institutions fail to meet the demands of justice.14 The classic
instance of this problem is the obligation of a wealthy person to aid
those disadvantaged by injustice, especially the poor. If we think that,
though “[j]ustice is the first virtue of social institutions,”15 injustice can
also arise outside of organized societies, then the moral situation of an
individual in an unjust society is one example of a larger set of
problems that arise when justice requires the cooperation of many
people. When there is no society or collective organization that could
reform its institutions to achieve justice, it is even less plausible that
individuals are shielded from direct interpersonal duties to the
distressed. These duties might be still more robust where social
institutions cannot adopt an effective mandatory scheme that is
sufficient to achieve some important collective end. For example, it
might be that enforceable mandatory rules regarding masks and social
distancing cannot be finely tailored well enough to contain the
pandemic. It seems likely that individuals each have some duty to
behave according to pro-social norms that are more demanding than
baseline legal rules. The precise scope and magnitude of individual
duties in pursuit of collective justice is difficult to answer, but most
people would agree that individuals are required to take steps that
contribute to important collective ends.
I focus here on a narrow but not unusual set of cases that also
involve an individual navigating moral demands on a collective. But
in the subset I consider here, individuals are not only incapable of
achieving justice; they are also incapable of either promoting it, in the
sense of making it more likely, or of advancing it, by mitigating
injustice on the margin. In the examples above, individuals are in a
14

See Elizabeth Ashford, The Demandingness of Scanlon’s Contractualism, 113 ETHICS
273, 274–75 (2003); Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Justice and Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 193, 194, 197 (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince
Saprai eds., 2014); Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Injustice and Private Law, 60 HASTINGS L.J.
105, 135 (2008); David Miller, Taking Up the Slack? Responsibility and Justice in Situations
of Partial Compliance, in RESPONSIBILITY AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 230, 236–37 (Carl
Knight & Zofia Stemplowska eds., 2011); LIAM B. MURPHY, MORAL DEMANDS IN
NONIDEAL THEORY 4 (2000); Tamar Schapiro, Compliance, Complicity, and the Nature of
Nonideal Conditions, 100 J. OF PHIL. 329, 331, 348 (2003).
15
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (rev. ed. 1999) (“Justice is the first virtue of
social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought.”).
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position to make a difference: a wealthy person is in a position to
improve the lives of some people, even if she cannot achieve justice
writ large. Wearing a mask and keeping distance makes it less likely
that you will infect someone who may, as a result, never get sick at all.
In such cases, the individual makes a difference, even if she cannot
achieve distributive justice or bring an end to the pandemic. This is
not always true.
Suppose that climate catastrophe can only be averted if billions of
people alter their lifestyles in significant ways, sufficient to bring
carbon emissions below some critical threshold. Suppose too that
there is no chance that this will happen before it is too late. An
individual on these posited facts has no ability to avert disaster. It
might be that there are some actions that have marginal benefits—not
using any one plastic bottle might make it less likely that one sea animal
chokes to death. But if we assume that reducing carbon emissions in
a given geographic area has no local benefits, then “contributing” to a
global reduction in carbon emissions with the aim of averting climate
catastrophe is futile.16
The individual in this situation is in a tragic position. Even if she
were willing to cooperate, she cannot. Cooperation requires the
participation of other people. In fact, cooperation in this case requires
the cooperation of billions of people. In the example involving
political resistance, cooperation may require the contributions of
millions of people. Even the company and listserv examples might
require the cooperation of dozens. In these cases, does the individual
have a duty to do what everyone should do, even if not many others are
doing it?
In this Part, I will suggest that the answer turns primarily on
whether we are permitted to factor agent predictions into our moral
deliberations. Agent predictions are predictions about what other
agents will do. In the usual discussion of noncompliance, it is more or
less assumed that we can take into account the reality of what other
people are doing; indeed, the typical argument that the privileged owe
the oppressed more under conditions of background injustice
depends precisely on the fact that others are not fulfilling their duties
and are unlikely to alter their course dramatically, either individually
or collectively.17 But in other contexts, discussed below, we often
rightly resist the idea that our moral obligations are contingent on the
16

The reader should assume any further facts, for purposes of this hypothetical,
that render it futile.
17
See sources cited supra note 14.
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expected actions of others. This Part will explore why we resist, and
when it is right to do so. After arguing that agent predictions are
appropriate in the context of moral reasoning, I will suggest a nomartyr principle that denies a duty to (attempt to) contribute to
collective endeavors that are futile in the light of sound agent
predictions.
A. Agent Predictions
The Kantian categorical imperative does not seem to allow agent
predictions in the context of practical reasoning. The categorical
imperative is offered in three variations, but in its first formulation it
requires that one “[a]ct only in accordance with that maxim through
which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”18
In evaluating its merits, the deliberating agent is directed to assume
that the maxim under consideration would be universal law. But of
course, Kant knows as well as anyone that it will not be a law of the
physical kind, which all objects will follow. Even a moral precept by
which all are bound can be broken, like any human law.
Kant’s language is almost bittersweet in its acceptance of the gap
between what moral law requires of the people around us and what
they are likely to do. Kant insists it is the former that controls in our
analysis of our own moral duties:
[A]lthough the rational being might punctiliously follow
these maxims himself, he cannot for that reason count on
everyone else’s being faithful to them, nor on the realm of
nature and its purposive order’s harmonizing with him . . .
the law ‘Act in accordance with maxims of a universally legislative member for a merely possible realm of ends’ still remains in full force, because it commands categorically.19
On this view, an individual’s duty to act in accordance with a maxim
that she would will to be universal seems to entail a duty to engage in
futile acts. For some readers, this might be an extreme implication
that depends on articulating the maxim at hand poorly. But I think
Kant is committed to a deep aversion to agent predictions, and his
reasons capture something quite fundamental about agency.
Kant is more generally committed to the view that we sometimes
should “assent” to beliefs that do not have a sufficient epistemic or
rational basis because they serve some fundamental purpose for the
18

IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 37 (Allen W.
Wood ed. & trans., Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1785).
19
Id. at 56.

2022]LAW & MORAL DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

159

subject.20 One of these beliefs on which we must operate is the idea of
freedom. In order to make choices, we must take ourselves to be free.
Because we have to make choices, the assumption of our own freedom
is inescapable.21 Even if we perceive the empirical world to behave
according to deterministic laws, and we perceive ourselves to be a part
of that world, as agents we must understand ourselves to operate in
some other domain. In the domain of practical reasoning, we must
“take on” a belief in our own freedom because, without it, we cannot
function as agents at all.22
We could interpret the idea of freedom in Kant narrowly and read
it only to entail that each individual believe only herself capable of
spontaneous action. But this cannot be squared with Kant’s moral
theory, the entirety of which is an implication of freedom, on his view.
It is freedom that requires that we abide by maxims endorsed by reason
so that we can be self-governing rather than swept along by natural
causation. That same capacity for reason and self-governance requires
that we treat others as ends in themselves because they too are free
agents capable of spontaneous action and governed by their own
capacities for reason. The moral stance of the categorical imperative—
which directs us to assume that others will abide by the same rule to
which we subject ourselves—is one that regards others as equally
capable of self-governance by reason. It requires that we assume that
others will comply with the categorical imperative too. Therefore, in
our own deliberations about what to do, we cannot incorporate an
expectation that others will fall short and render our own actions
futile. It is an unlikely reading of Kant that we must each accord high
significance to our own freedom without concerning ourselves with the
implications of other people’s freedom for ourselves.
I reject this view; however, my target is not really Kant. His view
matters because the Kantian idea that we must act as though others are
free and unpredictable, regardless of whether that belief is objectively
correct, resonates with intuitions we continue to harbor, and which are
reflected in criminal, tort, and constitutional law.23 In each of these

20

For a detailed discussion of varieties of assent in Kant’s theory, see Andrew
Chignell, Kant’s Concepts of Justification, 41 NOÛS 33, 34 (2007).
21
Henry E. Allison, We Can Act Only Under the Idea of Freedom, 71 PROC. & ADDRESSES
AM. PHIL. ASSOC., 39 Nov. 1997, at 39, 40.
22
Id. at 43.
23
A belief that we must hold and abide by, irrespective of whether it is objectively
true, is “regulative.” See Michael Friedman, Regulative and Constitutive, 30 S. J. OF PHIL.
73, 75 (1991).
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contexts, we have traditionally resisted agent predictions, either by the
state or by other agents.
In arguably the most pivotal context, we affirm the independence
of action and decline to infer wrongdoing in a given criminal case from
past behavior. As Amit Pundik has argued, we cannot infer guilt with
respect to a given crime from past criminal behavior without
contradicting the moral basis for attributions of culpability.24 It is even
more outrageous to infer guilt, and it is impermissible even to impose
undue burdens on those who find themselves in groups that are
statistically more likely to be convicted of crimes.25 When liberty itself
is at stake, we understand that we cannot treat individuals as objects
whose movements are a simple function of known variables.26 We insist
on the spontaneity of action that is Kant’s starting point.
The criminal context is distinguishable because the state itself
would make the agent prediction at issue. We might worry about agent
predictions by the state in other, less high-stakes contexts as well, such
as in the regulatory context of nudging.27 There too, the state uses
informed predictions about individual behavior to shape policies,
which are in turn intended to alter individual behavior. Our worries
with respect to state predictions are different though, because the
agent making the predictions is of a different sort. While it seems to
me likely that a liberal state is especially constrained in what it can take
itself to know about citizens and what they want and will do, state
predictions about agents raise questions that are different than those
raised by individual-level practical reasoning.
The tort law surrounding intervening wrongdoing is mixed in its
attitude toward agent predictions. Heidi Hurd has objected to the
range of doctrines that “compel findings of liability in instances in
which the only wrongdoing with which persons can be charged is the
failure to alter their (otherwise) legitimate activities in anticipation of
24

Amit Pundik, Freedom and Generalisation, 37 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 193, 200
(2017).
25
Pundik argues that “attributing culpability to an individual requires
presupposing that she was free to determine her own behaviour and hence
generalisations which require presupposing the opposite should not be used for that
purpose.” Id. at 190.
26
For a sobering review of the extent to which our commitment is incomplete in
the context of pretrial detention, see Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting
Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 500–01, 558–70 (2012).
27
See Cass R. Sunstein, Do People Like Nudges?, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 177, 179 (2016);
Sheri B. Pan, Get to Know Me: Protecting Privacy and Autonomy Under Big Data’s Penetrating
Gaze, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 239, 251 (2016).
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others’ illegitimate ones.”28 Anthony Duff is similarly skeptical about
liability in circumstances where there is intervening wrongdoing.29 But
to a significant extent, the doctrine actually reflects their discomfort
with agent predictions in the private sphere. Courts have not
recognized a duty to refrain from selling or giving goods to persons
just because the seller can or should foresee that the recipient might
misuse the goods, which Benjamin Zipursky and John Goldberg argue
would amount to an expansion of negligent entrustment to negligent
enabling.30 Courts are open to claims that parents negligently enabled
their children (e.g., in the latter’s cyberbullying).31 But hosts are not
usually responsible for the misdeeds of their (adult) drunk guests
upon departure,32 and a tractor manufacturer that installed a texting
device in its tractors was not liable for an accident that a driver caused
by texting while operating such a tractor.33
It took many years for tobacco producers to be held civilly
responsible for injuries to tobacco users,34 and liability for
manufacturers of sugary drinks may never come.35 Notably, success in
tobacco litigation stemmed in large part from the active deceit
perpetrated by the tobacco industry, especially in marketing to
children, rather than the bare act of selling goods that are addictive
28

Heidi M. Hurd, Is it Wrong to Do Right When Others Do Wrong? A Critique of American
Tort Law, 7 LEGAL THEORY 307, 311–12 (2001).
29
R.A. Duff, Is Accomplice Liability Superfluous?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 444, 451 (2008)
(“[I]t is not my business that what I do makes it easier for P to commit the crime partly
because it is P’s business whether he commits the crime . . . it is up to P whether he
commits the crime or not and—at least sometimes—I am not required to guide my
actions by my knowledge of what P will do.”).
30
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Intervening Wrongdoing in Tort: The
Restatement (Third)’s Unfortunate Embrace of Negligent Enabling, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1211, 1221–24 (2009).
31
Ronen Perry, Civil Liability for Cyberbullying, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1219, 1239
(2020); Wade R. Habeeb, Annotation, Parents’ Liability for Injury or Damage Intentionally
Inflicted by Minor Child, 54 A.L.R.3d 974, § 9 (1973).
32
See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 30, at 1228.
33
Durkee v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 742, 756–58
(W.D.N.C. 2010) (“If . . . a legal duty to anticipate misuse were to be imposed on
[texting device] manufacturers, no vehicle would be capable of traveling above the
speed limit, car ignitions would all be equipped with ignition interlock devices, and
guns would not be sold to persons with poor judgment.”).
34
See DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A
DEADLY INDUSTRY, at xi, xiii–xiv, 391 (2001).
35
Regulation aimed at sugary drinks mostly aims to alter consumer behavior. See
Alexia Brunet Marks, Taming America’s Sugar Rush: A Traffic-Light Label Approach, 62
ARIZ. L. REV. 683, 691 (2020).
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and harmful.36 The tobacco and sugary drinks examples are also
distinguishable because the harm from those products is borne by the
intervening actor; the buyer of the tobacco or sugary drinks is usually
also the user. On the other hand, the intervening actions in these
cases—consumption or excess consumption—are not just predictable;
they are intended and encouraged.37
Notwithstanding these limitations on liability for harms brought
about by intervening agents, there are now established lines of cases in
which individuals are held liable for careless acts that make some
criminal acts more likely. For example, many people have pressed for
liability for how guns are marketed and distributed, with some early
success.38 Gun manufacturers won federal statutory protections, which
thwarted the development of tort theories that would hold them
accountable,39 and the public is divided about whether it is appropriate
to hold manufacturers and retailers responsible for the wrongdoing of
third parties.40 But recent legislation in New York would circumvent
the federal statute protecting gun manufacturers by empowering
individuals to bring civil suits against manufacturers and dealers, and
President Biden indicated that he would support the repeal of the
federal immunity statute.41 A few weeks later, Remington, a gun
manufacturer, offered $33 million to families of the Sandy Hook
massacre to settle claims filed against it.42
Still more telling examples involve cases where an individual is
held responsible for predicting wrongdoing by some agent but no
36
See generally RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA’S HUNDRED-YEAR
CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS
(1996) (describing the history of deceit by tobacco industry); Michael V. Ciresi et al.,
Decades of Deceit: Document Discovery in the Minnesota Tobacco Litigation, 25 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 477, 479 (1999).
37
See Richard A. Daynard et al., Live for Now: Teens, Soda Marketing, and the Law, 9
J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 149, 172 (2013).
38
See Vanessa O’Connell & Paul M. Barrett, Squabbling, Jury Panel Managed to Form
Consensus on Negligence, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 16, 1999, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/SB919122340860404500.
39
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903.
40
Of course, there are other relevant disagreements as well, such as whether guns
should be sold to individuals at all.
41
Luis Ferré-Sadurní, It’s Hard to Sue Gun Makers. New York Is Set to Change That,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/08/nyregion/gunmanufacturers-lawsuit.html.
42
Rick Rojas & Kristin Hussey, Is Remington’s $33 Million Offer Enough to End Sandy
Hook Massacre Case?, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07
/29/nyregion/sandy-hook-shooting-remington-settlement.html.
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particular agent. Liability is most likely in these cases; that is, we seem
more comfortable accepting agent predictions about people in
general than about particular persons.43 In the so-called key-inignition cases, someone leaves their keys in the ignition of their car,
making it easier to steal the car. Courts are sometimes, but not always,
willing to hold owners liable in negligence for injuries sustained as a
result of a thief having ready access to a car which he then misuses.
Courts have not categorically ruled out liability if the keys were left in
the ignition of a car located in a “high-crime” area.44 Other types of
property owners have been more readily held accountable to victims
for making crime more likely: apartment buildings and the owners of
parking lots have both been held responsible for safety on their
premises.45 Courts have also found liability when not only the potential
wrongdoer but also the potential victim was any member of the public,
not someone to whom the defendant stood in a special relationship.
For example, in Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., a radio station conducted
a contest in which the first listener to reach a disk jockey traveling on
the freeway would win a prize.46 The location of the disk jockey was
revealed through a series of clues.47 Two teenage drivers in separate
vehicles raced to get to the jockey first, resulting in the death of
another driver on the highway.48 The station was held liable.49
One early case helped spark what is now a growing line of cases
that recognizes the responsibility to avoid putting someone—or
anyone—in a dangerous position, even where the danger at issue lies
in the wrongful conduct of another person. In Hines v. Garrett, a train
conductor missed a stop and let a passenger out in what was considered

43
I will myself argue below that generalized predictions are more permissible than
particularized ones. See infra Part III.A.
44
See Palma v. U.S. Indus. Fasteners, 681 P.2d 893, 902 (Cal. 1984); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Grain Belt Breweries, Inc., 245 N.W.2d 186 (Minn. 1976);
Guaspari v. Gorsky, 36 A.D.2d 225 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971); Robert L. Rabin, Enabling
Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 441, 446 (1999).
45
See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 486–87 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (determining the owner of an apartment building responsible for safety on
the premises); Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 445 A.2d 1141, 1146 (N.J. 1982)
(explaining that the New York Court of Appeals “recently reaffirmed its imposition of
a real property owner’s duty to protect against foreseeable criminal acts on his
premises….”).
46
See 539 P.2d 36, 37–38 (Cal. 1975).
47
Id. at 44.
48
Id. at 45.
49
Id. at 42.
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a dangerous area.50 Although the court “[did] not wish to be
understood as questioning the general proposition that no
responsibility for a wrong attaches whenever an independent act of a
third person intervenes between the negligence complained of and the
injury,” it held that “this proposition does not apply where the very
negligence alleged consists of exposing the injured party to the act
causing the injury.”51 Hines specifically observed that while there may
be a general “presumption . . . that crimes of this character will not be
committed,” the presumption “is not to be indulged, and ordinarily
prudent men do not indulge it, to the extent of regarding it safe to
expose a young woman to such a risk as the plaintiff in this case
incurred . . . .”52 Although the court seemed to find the discharge of
the passenger at the wrong location problematic mostly because it was
in a neighborhood that was considered dangerous, arguably it is just
this element that made the case most problematic—marking out a
particular neighborhood as so dangerous that it was imprudent for
anyone to cause a woman to walk through it. One might wonder
whether it is really the case that women did not walk through that
neighborhood, or perhaps just not women that resembled the plaintiff
in that case.
What we can observe here is a trend in favor of holding people
accountable for creating the conditions of others’ wrongdoing.53 Most
important for our purposes, the actions of the intervening agent are
regarded as foreseeable. But these cases are still framed as exceptions
to the general rule that liability does not extend to conduct that only
results in harm because of the intervening acts of another autonomous
person.
Legal resistance to agent prediction, which I take here to be
indicative of a deeper moral intuition, has proven more robust when
speech is at issue. I have argued elsewhere that the First Amendment
operates on a regulative assumption54 that individuals are capable of

50

108 S.E. 690, 691 (Va. 1921).
Id. at 695
52
Id. at 694.
53
Rabin, supra note 44, at 453. (“Looking back to the early 1900s one would have
been hard put to predict where our social mores and ethical dictates would take us in
creating legal obligations to protect against injuries from unrelated third parties.”).
Rubin hesitates to predict the future; the characterization of these cases as establishing
a trend is my own.
54
See generally Friedman, supra note 23.
51
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deliberating about and assessing the quality of speech.55 Thus, the
state is not permitted to restrict one person’s speech on the grounds
that injuries will result from other people failing to act as free,
deliberative agents. The state regulates speech mostly where there is
no opportunity for deliberation, as where a person shouts “fire” in a
movie theater. In those cases, we can expect that harms will follow
even without any agent’s failure to live up to the demands of her own
agency. But if a person stands up in a park and tells people to raise
arms against others, that speech is usually protected.56 It is up to the
listeners not to raise arms; and if someone does, she alone bears legal
responsibility.
The two categories of speech which may result in a kind of speaker
liability for third party actions are fighting words and incitement.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire held that fighting words by their nature
incite immediate violence and may thus be restricted.57 But fighting
words doctrine has since been narrowly construed.58 The other
category is incitement. For incitement to fall outside the protective
scope of the First Amendment, the speaker’s words must be “directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and … likely to incite
or produce such action.”59 It turns out to be very difficult to
characterize speech as unprotected under either doctrine.60
Notwithstanding legal protection, as individuals, we have more
than one reason not to incite others to violence. Even if the state is
not prepared to recognize some speech as incitement, as I observed
above in the criminal context, it might be constrained in its attitude
toward citizens in ways that individuals are not vis- à-vis one another. It
seems not only permissible but morally mandatory that individuals
refrain from speech that we predict could lead to actual violence,

55
Aditi Bagchi, Deliberative Autonomy and Legitimate State Purpose Under the First
Amendment, 68 ALBANY L. REV. 815, 823–29 (2005).
56
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969).
57
315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
58
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
59
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
60
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment
Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 815 (2010) (because “First Amendment doctrines rely
on a model of the audience as rational, skeptical, and capable of sorting through
masses of information to find truth,” cases that allow liability for incitement are rare
outliers).
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should someone heed our invitation.61 Thus, the free speech
examples, like the tort examples, demonstrate both that there is a
strong intuition that it is not always appropriate to act on agent
predictions but also that it would be wrong to set those aside
categorically.
One might argue that these legal doctrines are inapt because at
issue is whether we can expect someone to do something or not
because her action will cause another person to commit serious wrongs
against another. Maybe we are permitted—and even expected—to
make agent predictions when not making those predictions could
result in serious injury; it could be nevertheless impermissible to make
agent predictions just to avoid taking futile action. That is, maybe the
regulatory presumption of spontaneous action may only be invoked
against us: it can heighten our obligations under both noncompliant
social institutions and where there is a rational expectation of thirdparty wrongdoing. But, on this view, we cannot invoke agent
predictions to excuse ourselves from conduct.
It is doubtful that agent presumptions operate asymmetrically in
this way. As discussed further below, it may be virtuous to set aside
certain applicable reasons when doing so makes it more likely that you
and others will fulfill moral duties over the long run. But, for now, I
am only concerned with whether it is permissible to take into account
agent predictions. And if the law regularly requires us to act on those
predictions, it seems unlikely that we are morally required to ignore
them—unless we are prepared to dismiss many legal doctrines at once
as all confused. The underlying reasons for resisting agent predictions,
if they are rightly captured by Kant, apply in the context of practical
reasoning about what we are required to do, including both whether
we are obliged to take certain precautions or whether we are required
to contribute to a potential collective action.
In fact, there is some reason to think that agent predictions are
even more appropriate outside these legal contexts. In the kinds of
legal cases just discussed, the defendant is alleged to have caused
wrongful action by a third party. Admittedly, the causation claim is
attenuated; it requires that we accept “enabling” as a mechanism of
causation. But even this element of causation is absent in moral
collective action problems where agents are making separate,
simultaneous (or at least, non-mutually responsive) decisions about
61

See Jonathan S. Masur, Probability Thresholds, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1293, 1299–1300
(2007) (discussing how courts strike a balance between free speech principle and
potential physical harms from speech).
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what to do. Indeed, the whole point of the moral collection action
problem is that no individual is in a position meaningfully to cause a
group either to meet or fail its collective obligation.
The moral failure of the group may very well be a moral blemish
on the individual, short of a culpable wrong. When a group to which
we belong—a university, book club, union, firm or country—engages
in wrongdoing, we rightly feel tainted. These blemishes on our
character are not unlike other results that flow remotely from our
actions, so remotely as to put them outside of our effective control.
What we have learned from the philosophical literature on “moral
luck” is that, contra Kant, most of us are not prepared to disavow our
moral dependence on events in the material world.62 We know that
our moral standing depends on what actually happens, and we do not
control that.63 Still, most of us no longer regard the physical,
determinate world as a corruption or an embarrassment. We not only
accept but embrace that we are physical beings, situated in bodies that
inhabit a physical world.64 We no longer take our moral personality to
be the pure product of our capacity for reason; the salient features of
our respective identities are more bound up in our differences, which
in turn are the product of numerous contingent features of our
environment and arbitrary events in our particular life stories. The
Kantian impulse to elevate our mental world above our physical one
rests on anxieties that are inescapable—such as the problem of free
62

See BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973–1980 20–39
(1981) (introducing the concept of moral luck and exploring its challenge to Kantian
moral theory); THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 24–38 (Canto ed. 1991)
(developing the concept of moral luck).
63
See John Gardner, Obligations and Outcomes in the Law of Torts, in RELATING TO
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS FOR TONY HONORÉ ON HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 111, 136 (Peter
Cane & John Gardner eds., 2001) (“To deny that success can have independent
rational significance is to leave us without any story of our lives as practical reasoners.”);
Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY
AND THE LAW OF TORTS 72, 83 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001) (“[O]utcome-responsibility
in the achievement sense comprises a fundamental element in our understanding of
our own agency.”).
64
See Nagel, supra 62 at 37–38; Tony Honoré, Responsibility and Luck: The Moral Basis
of Strict Liability, 104 L. Q. REV. 530, 543 (1988) (“If actions and outcomes were not
ascribed to us on the basis of our bodily movements and their mental
accompaniments, we could have no continuing history or character.”); Stephen R.
Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 505–07 (1992) (arguing
agency is “meaningful notion” because one can imagine agent with knowledge of all
relevant causal regularities who is capable of controlling natural processes, and
observing outcome responsibility involves “retrospective evaluation of action” that
turns on what would have been foreseeable to such an idealized agent).
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will—but also hierarchies—such as favoring the universal over the
particular, or the spiritual over the material—that are anachronistic.
And so, while there must be some constraints on how we respond to
facts about the world, we should not be expected to set aside
completely what we know about the world and how it works, including
the behavior of the flawed agents that constitute its social dimension.
B. The No-Martyr Principle
I will return to the matter of when we may act on agent predictions
in the next Part.65 In this section, I elaborate on the implication of
those predictions (where we may make them) in the context of moral
collective action problems.
If we may make agent predictions then, in the context of moral
collective action problems, we sometimes know that any action of ours
is insufficient to avoid collective wrongdoing. For many people, it
seems obvious that one has no duty to engage in such futile action.
Felix Pinkert states that it is “implausible” that “you ought to contribute
even if not enough others contribute as well” such that the action
would be “pointless.”66 John Gardner has argued that there is no duty
to try if trying is futile, even when the duty to succeed persists.67
Similarly, Björn Petersson seems to assume that an individual cannot
be morally responsible for a collective harm if her omitted act would
have made no difference “to the occurrence of the event in question.”68
Donald Regan says one must “cooperate, with whoever else is cooperating, in the production of the best consequences possible given
the behaviour of non-co-operators” but he should not be read to imply one
has a duty to cooperate hypothetically.69 Actual cooperation requires
that there be at least one other person participating in the act of
cooperation. Virginia Held has persuasively argued that one might be
responsible for failing to act collectively under nonideal conditions,
but this is different from failing to act as if everyone were acting

65

The second section of Part III proposes and elaborates an equality constraint on
agent predictions.
66
Felix Pinkert, What We Together Can (Be Required To) Do, 38 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL.
187, 189 (2014).
67
John Gardner, The Wrongdoing That Gets Results, 18 PHIL. PERSPECTIVES 53, 56
(2004).
68
Björn Petersson, Collective Omissions and Responsibility, 37 PHIL. PAPERS 243, 251–
52 (2008).
69
DONALD H. REGAN, UTILITARIANISM AND CO-OPERATION 134 (1980) (emphasis
added).
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collectively.70 On her account, fault lies in failure to cooperate where
possible (as where there is an available decision-procedure or a salient
single solution to a collective problem), not in failure to act
unilaterally.71
Some have argued that we can assign responsibility to a person
even if she lacked the capacity to avoid the wrongdoing.72 But these
attributions are usually in contexts where the agent is uniquely thrust
into the causal chain of events leading to the wrong. They are
distinguishable from scenarios where the individual’s only
participation is by way of an anonymous omission that is
indistinguishable from that of numerous other agents.
Christopher Kutz is the scholar who has most forcefully advocated
for a duty to act in accord with a collective plan even where no plan
has been collectively formed.73 While the argument I have thus far
considered in favor of a duty to perform futile actions is founded on a
rejection of agent predictions, Kutz offers a different kind of argument
in favor of understanding ourselves bound in these situations. It is
essentially an argument from collective moral necessity.74 Kutz argues
that “[s]olving the problem of marginal effects requires not simply an
institutional mechanism guaranteeing general compliance but also a
psychological solution that preserves the human face of the claim upon
me.”75 We are not supposed to ask, he says, “[w]hat should I do, given
what others do?” because “the only effective way to solve the problem
is to ask a different question, namely: What should we do to meet the
claims of the [imperiled group] while minimizing the demands on
each of us?”76
One way of understanding Kutz’s argument is that he too wishes
us to act on a regulatory presumption. But instead of a presumption
that agents are capable of spontaneous action, such that we cannot
know that they will not act in service of collective moral duties, Kutz
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Virginia Held, Can a Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally Responsible?, 67 J.
471, 476 (1970).
71
Id. at 476–77.
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See, e.g., D.E. Cooper, Collective Responsibility, 43 PHIL. 258, 264 (1968).
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See generally CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE
AGE (2000); Christopher Kutz, The Collective Work of Citizenship, 8 LEGAL THEORY 471
(2002).
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I will argue in Part IV for the limits of theories of individual obligation based on
collective moral necessity.
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Kutz, The Collective Work of Citizenship, supra 73, at 478 (emphasis added).
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Id. at 479.
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would have us operate on the presumption that we are members of an
organized and functioning collective. This interpretation of Kutz is
consistent with his argument that allegiance and social membership
are reasons for acting in accord with a joint plan, even if that plan is
imaginary.77 He argues that we should act like we are working together
as a team, apparently even when we are not part of a team at all—unless
the idea is that the relevant group is ultimately all of humanity, as it is
accidentally configured to face various problems of justice as they arise.
I will address below the more general question of whether we
should understand necessity to give rise to moral duties in the way that
Kutz implies, or whether we must accept that sometimes individuals
can comply with their moral duties and still produce an unjust state of
affairs.78 Here, I focus on the more specific question of whether we
should assume not that other agents are free and their future actions
unknowable, but that we are together a kind of team with duties to
abide by the plans that such a hypothetical team would produce. Such
a team could be a few people working together to rescue a drowning
man, all the voters in the United States working together to implement
democracy, or all consumers in rich countries working together to shut
down sweatshops in poor countries.
Such a presumption of team or group cooperation is not
motivated and cannot bind us. If the team in question is all humanity,
it is awkward to deny membership. But what kind of team is this?
Teams are defined by boundaries; they are finite. Indeed, they usually
have opponents. And if humanity is the relevant team, how do we
know our assigned roles or the specified goals of the team in a given
context? On the other hand, if the team in question is the subset of
individuals who are in a position to achieve justice of a particular kind,
it is not clear why we owe them allegiance. John Gardner argues that
it is actually illiberal to invoke “team”-like reasons as ones that bind us
all to some collective pursuit.79 We did not choose to associate with
them; we do not know whether they are people that we might like or
dislike, endorse or repudiate. We tend to feel obligations toward
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Kutz offers this in the context of a discussion of the obligation to vote, which he
says is “best treated in terms of allegiance, as part of the general set of commitments
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See Part IV.
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family that are similarly independent of choice or merit, but familial
loyalty is more often considered a fact that we have to accommodate in
theories of justice than a duty of justice itself.
There is still another problem with a team presumption.
Understanding our duty to act in moral collective action problems on
such an account characterizes the duty as one we owe to other team
members. But surely when we have a collective obligation to avert
some harm, the primary duty is owed to those who stand in harm’s way,
and any duty to others is merely derivative. To be sure, we have a duty
of fair play that entails a duty to do our fair share and bear our fair
burden, and that duty is owed to hypothetical team members. But
these arise only after a norm or plan is in place or plausible, and they
are secondary to the primary duty in the context of moral collective
action problems, which runs to the prospective victims of collective
inaction.
If we reject both a categorical rule against agent predictions and
a presumption of team membership with attendant obligations of
solidarity, we can affirm the no-martyr principle: there is no duty to
take action in service of a collective duty if the action will not advance
a fulfillment of the collective duty.
One might argue that the no-martyr principle is theoretically valid
but practically irrelevant because we can never know what others will
do in the way we must in order for it to have effect. That is, even if we
are not bound by any presumption that bars agent predictions, it might
be that we are just never in a position to predict with confidence that
other agents will not cooperate. As long as it is possible for our actions
to make a difference, we are not free to refuse action that could
advance a valuable end.
It is true, of course, that we can never be sure about what will
result from our actions. But the no-martyr principle should not be
understood to require action in furtherance of collective moral
demands, just so long as we cannot conclusively rule out the possibility
of making a difference. It is almost always possible that one person’s
actions will have an unexpected cascading effect that will, for example,
spur others to action or raise social consciousness regarding a
problem. If this possibility is of negligible probability, the prospect for
impact alone cannot ground the obligation. It is actually even less
plausible that we could be required to make substantial sacrifices
either for the small possibility of making a difference or the
meaningful possibility of making a trivial difference than it is plausible
that we could be required to take actions irrespective of whether they
make a difference. The latter argument at least rests on a claim about
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the right way to think about our duties and what we can take into
account; it rests on a plausible claim that consequences of individual
acts do not figure directly into whether they are required.
By contrast, relying on unlikely or trivial causal impact of an
action to render it compulsory assumes that consequences do matter.
But if consequences matter, then it has to matter exactly what the
consequences are, not just whether there is a consequence. And if
consequences matter, then the consequences of the action for the
agent matter too. If the burdens on the agent are taken into account,
negligible probability of impact and trivial impact alone will require
only costless action.
If we are entitled to make predictions about other agents, we are
entitled to make sound predictions and act on those. Of course, we
should be more careful when the stakes are higher. If two rescuers will
succeed where one will fail, we had better go ahead and try rather than
coldly predict that our fellow would-be rescuer will be too lazy. By
contrast, if I am one of several noisy patrons of a bar with open windows
and I rationally believe that silencing myself alone will deliver no
benefit to the neighbor who wants to sleep, it might be okay for me to
act on the prediction that reducing my own noise level is pointless.
The more remote the odds of cooperative success, and the lower the
stakes, the more robust the license reflected in the no-martyr principle.
In high-stakes situations, or where it is genuinely unclear what others
will do, we must be appropriately risk-averse in our agent predictions.
I am not arguing here that we should not err on the side of complying
with a duty that would exist should it be possible to make a difference;
only that if there is a duty to act, it will turn on some prospect for
impact together with some level of risk tolerance. In most cases, we
cannot be sure that our actions will have no consequence, but because
results matter, we should take into account the prospects for making a
difference in deciding not only whether to try, but also how hard to
try. Symbolic acts may be justified, but they are usually justified in some
quite separate way that probably has more to do with expression than
advancing material justice.
The phenomenon of moral collective problems has consequences
for the legal rules that govern individual conduct. In fact, the common
law of private law largely respects it. Liability in common law usually
involves finding that some conduct by the defendant was wrong, that
she should have acted otherwise. Absent the no-martyr principle, we
would expect people to be liable for a range of acts and omissions that
are antisocial; justice would be served if everyone held themselves to a
higher standard. Yet we see that private law, which is backward-
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looking, does not find wrongdoing because an individual did not
comport to the standard of behavior that, if universalized, would be
optimal from a social point of view. Instead, contract law and tort law
both tend to assess the quality of a defendant’s actions in light of the
contingent circumstances in which she acted, taking full account of
how other agents behave and what difference the defendant really
made. A couple examples narrowly and broadly show the no-martyr
principle at work, albeit imperfectly in each case.
Very broadly, both contract and tort law do not recognize conduct
as wrongful unless the plaintiff demonstrates that she suffered an
injury, and that the defendant caused the particular injury suffered by
the plaintiff. 80 Common law-private law does not ordinarily impose
standards of conduct that are not general and backward-looking. We
tend to take these features for granted, but they are not inevitable.
Theoretically, we could allow recovery for potential or probable losses
resulting from breach of contract. We could find liability for
imposition of risk.81 We might allow liability for antisocial conduct,
absent any special duty to the plaintiff. We do not. Instead, we wait
until plaintiff has been actually harmed by defendant’s breach of a
duty before we recognize any claim.
The requirement of causation is sometimes implicit in contract,
but it is an express element of tort.82 Where individuals are not in a
position to prevent harm by altering their own conduct alone, tort law
does not offer recourse because the plaintiffs cannot establish
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There are exceptions that sound more property, like trespass. Within tort, I
have in mind primarily actions for negligence. See Red Ball Brewing Co. v. Buchanan
Ingersoll P.C., 51 Pa. D. & C.4th 129, 141–42 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2001) (“Claims
for breach of contract,
negligence
and
fraud require that
the
plaintiff
suffer damages as a proximate result of the defendant’s conduct.”); see also Nuncio v.
Rock Knoll Townhome Vill., Inc., 389 P.3d 370, 374 (Ok. App. 2016)
(“The essential elements of a negligence claim are a duty owed by the defendant to
protect the plaintiff from the injury alleged, a breach of the duty, and injury to the
plaintiff proximately caused thereby.”); Logan v. Mirror Printing Co., 600 A.2d 225,
226 (Pa. Super. 1991) (“[i]n order to recover for damages pursuant to
a breach of contract, the plaintiff must show a causal connection between the breach
and the loss.”).
81
See Adriana Placani, When the Risk of Harm Harms, 36 L. & PHIL. 77 (2017). But
see Perry, supra note 63 (rejecting treating risk imposition as injurious).
82
See Steed v. Bain-Holloway, 356 P.3d 62, 68 (Okla. Civ. App. 2015) (quoting State
ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Gurich, 238 P.3d 1, 4 (Okla. 2010)) (“Causation is a
traditional element of tort liability. In any tort, there must be ‘some reasonable
connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the damage which the
plaintiff has suffered.’”).
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causation. In most cases, a but-for causation standard applies.83 In
deviant cases, either an individual defendant’s conduct is found likely
sufficient to have brought about the injury, even if it was not also
necessary (as in the case of simultaneous shooters),84 or the defendants
are regarded as having acted together, implicitly if not explicitly (as in
enterprise liability).85 Causation is thus literally one of the elements of
private liability in tort and is consistent with the essence of the nomartyr principle, which affirms an obligation to act toward some
morally valuable end (usually the aversion of some harm) only if one’s
act can be expected to in fact contribute to that end.
In contract law, we can see the no-martyr principle play out
narrowly and somewhat obliquely in doctrines that relate to timing of
performance and recourse. It used to be that promises in contract
were treated as independent.86 Thus, even if the widget seller did not
deliver her widgets as due, the buyer could be sued for payment. To
the modern reader this is a bizarre result because of course the
promise of the buyer to pay is dependent on the seller’s performance.
Now courts meet this expectation by imputing constructive conditions
of exchange.87 The court supplies a default sequence of performance
and, if one party fails to perform, the other is excused from her
performance. Courts have evolved further. The implied sequence of
performance still leaves vulnerable the party who is supposed to
perform first. It used to be that nothing short of a definite repudiation
by the other party could relieve the first mover of her obligation to
perform. That is, anticipatory repudiation would require either a clear
verbal repudiation or conduct that made performance actually
impossible.88 This was a high bar and left no recourse for many parties
with good reasons for worrying that the other party would not perform.
By now we have the doctrine of adequate assurance, which allows a
party that reasonably doubts the performance of the other to be
forthcoming to demand assurance in writing. If the other party fails to
deliver adequate assurance, this failure can be treated as repudiation.89
83
Smith v. Steelcase, Inc., No. 223892, 2001 WL 1545992, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App.
Nov. 30, 2001).
84
See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1947).
85
Hall v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
86
K & G Constr. Co. v. Harris, 164 A.2d 451, 454–55 (Md. 1960) (describing
evolution of rule).
87
Id. at 455.
88
See, e.g., Taylor v. Johnston, 539 P.2d 425, 430 (Cal. 1975).
89
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 251 (1981).
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This is by no means a perfect application of the no-martyr principle as
I have suggested it. But courts have become more comfortable with
predictions by one party about the other’s performance, and courts no
longer require parties to act unilaterally where they have good reason
to doubt that the joint exchange will be realized. We might say we
require less martyrdom in contract now.
The no-martyr principle also sheds some sidelight on how courts
define the duties of care that defendants owe their plaintiffs in tort law.
Perhaps because an objective cost-benefit analysis of a proposed
conduct rule is rarely at hand, standards of care are usually set by
reference to community practices and expectations.90 The effect is that
no one is openly required to be a moral frontrunner. Courts avoid
retroactively applying a standard of conduct to which the defendant
could not have known she was subject at the time of the alleged tort.
The common law court aims to rest a finding of negligence on an
existing norm.91 Now, a defendant that fails to abide by a best practice
can be understood to have caused injury to a plaintiff even if there was
no social norm that required her to use the best practice rather than
some other commonplace one. In that respect, the defendant cannot
claim to be situated in a collective action problem because her actions
alone could have prevented injury. But while the standard of care
question is by no means a straightforward application of the no-martyr
principle, it is possible to think of the breach and causation inquiries
as less segmented than the doctrinal inquiry suggests. If whether the
defendant caused the plaintiff’s injury is itself a normative question
that turns in part on whether the defendant should have acted
differently, then the fact that the defendant complied with prevailing
social norms is relevant to the question of whether it is properly said
that the defendant’s shortcomings, rather than the shortcomings of

90

See, e.g., Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass’n, 349 A.2d 245, 246 (Md.
1975); see also Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126 YALE L.J. 1320, 1343
(2017) (“Tort . . . uses ‘community’ as a transom through which decision makers can
import extralegal norms to determine liability for injuries.”); Anita Bernstein, The
Communities That Make Standards of Care Possible, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 735, 764 (2002)
(discussing “communities” for purposes of setting the standard of care).
91
See Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1999) (“Custom’s role in tort law is pervasive.”). But see Mark A. Geistfeld,
Tort Law and the Inherent Limitations of Monetary Exchange: Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and the Negligence Rule, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 23–24 n.75 (2011) (“Whereas the substance of
first-order duties under the early common law were presumably constituted by preexisting norms, custom today plays a highly circumscribed role in negligence cases.”).
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social practice, caused the plaintiff’s injury.92 None of this is to suggest
that the doctrine should be framed differently. I aim only to suggest
that when we hold that a defendant did not breach her duty of care
because she acted more or less as she should have, we are functionally
refusing to hold her responsible for rising above deficient social
norms.
If common law judges aim to locate standards of care in
community norms, it makes sense that they are recognized to exercise
more law-making powers than their counterparts in civil law
jurisdictions. That is because even if common law judges imbue an
extralegal social norm with legal effect, judges can deny that they are
the original source of the norm they articulate.93 Courts are only
recognizing what the community organically rendered a norm, a norm
that was in some sense already binding on the defendant. While there
is a sharp difference between legal and social obligation, the existence
of some obligation may be sufficient to avoid violation of the no-martyr
principle.
The no-martyr principle is also accommodated in common law by
way of incremental rulemaking. It is rarely the case that conduct that
was clearly permissible at the time is found wrongful at the moment of
adjudication. If new norms are usually small extensions of existing
rules, new norms are less new, and the conduct was arguably
impermissible already. Again, the defendant is not subject to a
conduct rule that did not apply to others that were similarly situated.
Of course, once a legal norm has been announced prospectively, the
no-martyr principle is inapplicable. Legal norms that govern private
relations, like all legal norms that are not of constitutional status, can
be altered through ordinary legislative procedures.
III. THE DEMANDS OF EQUALITY
The no-martyr principle depends, as I have argued it, on agent
predictions. That is, it authorizes me to refrain from taking actions
that promote justice if one can predict that my actions will make no
92

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A (1965) (“In determining whether
conduct is negligent, the customs of the community, or of others under like
circumstances, are factors to be taken into account, but are not controlling.”).
93
See Dan Priel, Conceptions of Authority and the Anglo-American Common Law Divide,
65 AM. J. COMP. L. 609, 631 (2017) (“If the law succeeds in reflecting prevailing custom,
many problems with explaining its authority become less intractable. When law
reflects prevailing custom, it reflects standards of behavior already accepted. This
provides a solution to the common law’s lack of adequate notice and publicity, as well
as its alleged retroactivity.”).
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difference in light of the actions of others. I have suggested that agent
predictions are not categorically inappropriate. The contingency and
material rootedness of our situation as agents is not something to
ignore. These are such fundamental features of our personhood that
thinking about our agency as divorced from the messy reality in which
it operates generates a confusion rather than an ideal. The evolution
of several legal doctrines affirms this shift in how we think about agency
and what is valuable about it.
Even if human freedom itself does not demand that we feign
ignorance of human behavior, other principles could constrain what
kinds of information we act on. I will argue in this Part that the
principle of equality, on the one hand, animates the no-martyr
principle and, on the other hand, constrains what kinds of agent
predictions we can make and when we can make them.
A. Refusing Unfair Burdens
Scholars of private law have tended to exaggerate the problem of
horizontal equality among defendants. While some authors, including
myself, have argued that distributive justice has a role to play in
informing what individuals owe one another,94 most scholars of private
law have insisted that concerns of distributive justice are best left to
public law. Legal economists have argued this mostly on efficiency
grounds.95 But philosophers of private law have suggested, albeit
sometimes just in passing, that it is morally arbitrary to hold defendants
responsible for background injustice when they were not, as
individuals, in a position to prevent distributive injustice.96 On the flip
side, awarding poor plaintiffs higher damages because they are poor
would amount to a windfall as compared to others who are similarly
socially situated but happen not to have a recognized legal claim.

94
See, e.g., Bagchi, Distributive Justice and Contract, supra note 14; Bagchi, Distributive
Injustice and Private Law, supra note 14; Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnik, Rawls
and Contract Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 598, 604 (2005).
95
See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW & ECONOMICS 124–27
(2d ed. 1989); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 97–101
(1993); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 677 (1994).
96
See, e.g., Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J.
91, 96 (1995); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT
LAW: NEW ESSAYS 206, 257–58 (Peter Benson ed., 2001); Stephen R. Perry, On the
Relationship Between Corrective and Distributive Justice, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE:
FOURTH SERIES 237, 237–39 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000).
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I have argued in response that distributive justice is relevant in
contract, in particular, because individuals have a duty not to exploit
and exacerbate distributive injustice.97 Importantly, my contention
that individuals owe each other concern that might be unnecessary
under ideal conditions points to the causal impact that individuals can
have given background injustice. Nothing in those arguments suggests
that individuals should be held responsible in private law for
distributive injustice per se or that disadvantaged plaintiffs have legal
claims against individual privileged defendants by virtue of their
respective social roles alone.
Where individuals make no marginal contribution to injustice, I
argue here that not only should they not be legally liable for the
collective wrong—they have no private moral duty to undertake futile
efforts. As observed in Part II,98 distributive injustice is not a moral
collective action problem of the sort I am discussing here. That is
because individuals are in a position to ameliorate specific harms
associated with distributive injustice even if they are not in a position
to rectify the wrongful social state. By contrast, in a collective moral
action problem, the individual does not achieve anything from the
standpoint of justice by, say, protesting (given facts as I posited them
earlier).99
The no-martyr principle in the context of collective undertakings
is a cousin of the duty of fair play. Both derive from a principle of
equality among those in a group subject to certain collective demands.
We put aside for now cases where group members cooperate to

97

See Bagchi, Distributive Injustice and Private Law, supra note 14, at 135.
See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
99
Note that I am assuming, without arguing here, that individuals might very well
have heightened obligations in light of others’ noncompliance with an optimal
scheme. For example, they might have a duty to organize an alternative scheme of
cooperation or, in some cases, to make up at least in part for the shortfall of others. I
do not consider here whether this is true of collective and derivative individual duties
of beneficence in particular, as compared to other kinds of duties to promote justice.
Liam Murphy rejects that view at least with respect to the duty of beneficence and
endorses instead a “compliance condition” on individual duties of beneficence:
In situations of partial compliance . . . the sacrifice each agent is required to make is limited to the level of sacrifice that would be optimal
if the situation were one of full compliance; of the actions that require
no more than this level of sacrifice, agents are required to perform the
action that makes the outcome best.
Murphy, supra note 1, at 280. Although this is compelling for his central cases, I leave
open the possibility here that not all duties to promote justice are subject to the
compliance condition.
98
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advance a shared interest that has no moral valence (such as Nozick’s
example of a neighborhood radio station);100 arguably, in these cases,
whether an individual has a duty to contribute will turn on whether she
knowingly accepts a benefit or otherwise consents to the cooperative
scheme.101 There is no similar requirement of consent where a group
is subject to a moral imperative. In that case, individuals are not free
to choose nonparticipation. As long as the means for making relevant
decisions is fair, individuals are morally compelled to participate in a
scheme designed to fulfill justice obligations of the group.
Importantly, individuals are obligated to contribute even if their
individual participation is not essential to the ability of the group to
fulfill its collective duty. Imagine that within a fishing community,
people who fish purple fish rightly complain that the people who fish
green fish are fishing so much that there are not enough purple fish
left (because the purple fish eat the green fish and do not have enough
green fish left to eat). The people dealing in green fish set up a private
fund among themselves to pay for various environmental measures
that assist those dealing in purple fish, perhaps because there is no
political unit with jurisdiction or interest. The fund tends to use all its
available funds, but there is no evidence that its efficacy in aiding the
disadvantaged fishermen is affected by the precise level of funding
available.
I think most of us would say that the green fishermen are doubly
obligated. The hypothetical is intended to suggest a primary duty to
the purple fishermen, whose livelihoods the green fishermen have
disrupted. But in light of the cooperative scheme set up to fulfill that
primary duty, the green fishermen also each owe one another a fair
contribution to that scheme. This would be even more obvious if the
fund was amassed based on a graduated levy. It would be wrong to the
other green fishermen to misrepresent one’s fishing volume in order
to pay a smaller levy, even if doing so did not compromise one’s duty
to the purple fishermen because some other green fishermen would
make up your shortfall.

100

Robert Nozick offered a hypothetical where a neighborhood starts a radio
station and demands that each person on the street take turns operating it for one day
a year. He suggested that we would find it implausible that someone would be required
to contribute to the project he did not endorse or benefit from. ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 90–95 (1974).
101
RAWLS, supra note 15, at 111–12.
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The duty of fair play102 is intuitive and well-accepted, and it is
derivative from the principle of equality. It is wrong to free ride on the
contributions of others because everyone has life projects and private
interests that must be compromised in order to contribute to the
collective endeavor. To refuse to contribute one’s fair share is to
unreasonably assert the priority of one’s own projects and effectively
require their subsidization by others without justification.
The right to withhold participation from a collective action to
which others are not contributing flows from the same principle of
equality that gives rise to the duty of fair play in the first place. The
individual called upon to contribute to a collective effort is doubly
bound, both by a primary duty to whomever the group’s collective duty
is owed and a derivative duty (of fair play) to others in the group called
upon to act. In most cases, even if the duty to fellow group members
fails, one’s duty to contribute is sustained by her primary duty. Thus,
a green fisherman should not refuse to contribute to the measure in
aid of the purple fisherman just because he knows some other green
fishermen are not paying their fair share. It might be that if cheating
is sufficiently rampant, at some point a green fisherman should think
about what else she might do to fulfill her duty to the purple
fisherman. But the duty to the purple fisherman generates mandatory
reasons for an individual green fisherman even if the failure of the
cooperative scheme eviscerates the duty of fair play that a green
fisherman owes her fellow green fisherman.103
The moral collective action problem as I have defined it is one
where the primary duty cannot be met. I have argued that where one
cannot advance the moral interest in fulfilling the primary duty, it does
not give rise to mandatory reasons for action. In such a situation, the
nonparticipation of others in the obligated group also makes moot the
derivative duty of fair play. It cannot be owed to those who are not
playing themselves. Even if there are a few green fishermen who
dutifully continue to contribute, if a sufficient number of green
fishermen shirk, the scheme is defunct. The exercise in cooperation
has failed, and one cannot be said to be contributing to it any more

102

See Hart, supra note 6, at 185.
I have assumed that the green fisherman’s obligations might even increase upon
shirking by fellow green fishermen, if her contributions are effective in ameliorating
the problem of justice that motivates the cooperative scheme. This, however, is not
my object to defend that position here. One might argue instead that a green
fisherman’s obligations cannot increase as a result of noncompliance by fellow green
fishermen. See id.
103
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than one can pay taxes to a disbanded state. The green fishermen who
keep paying are trying to help, but this is not the same thing as actually
helping. In fact, John Gardner has argued that it should not even
qualify as trying.104 They are not advancing the collective duty given
the noncooperation of others. The result is that there is no duty to act
in furtherance of the primary duty at all in these cases. While I have
focused in earlier Parts on the idea that a primary collective duty does
not give reason to perform actions that will not advance the cause of
fulfilling that duty, the principle of equality has its own part to play in
explaining the no-martyr principle because it explains why the duty of
fair play does not bind the individual in any case. The derivative duty
is suspended because the principle of equality posits that no one
should have to carry the burdens of shirkers. Free riders are not
entitled to shift costs onto the cooperative. It makes sense then that
when people do free ride, those that would be willing to cooperate no
longer have a duty to them.105
Where my action cannot make a difference, the collective duty to
which I am subject cannot give me reason to perform that action.
Moreover, uncooperative behavior by others suspends the duty of fair
play that I would otherwise owe my group in furtherance of our
collective duty. I am left with no duty to perform the action in
question. Again, I might have unrelated reasons to act, and I have
reason to find some alternative path by which to advance the moral
interests that drive the collective duty. But I have no duty to do what
would have been required of me if others did the same.
There is one additional egalitarian dimension to the no-martyr
principle worthy of observation. As individuals, we usually join our
communities midstream. Many of the duties we collectively owe are
duties of repair. Our communities are already segmented. Neither
the spoils of past wrongs nor the power to rectify them are evenly
distributed. The no-martyr principle does not avoid the inequity that
those who did not benefit from collective wrongs may nevertheless
bear the burden of repairing them where they have the power to do
so. But it at least allocates the burdens of collective justice to those
104

“Someone who recognizes that his trying will not contribute to his succeeding
cannot conceivably try. This is because of the nature of trying. Trying is acting for the
reason that one’s action will (supposedly) contribute to one’s succeeding.” John
Gardner, The Wrongdoing That Gets Results, 18 PHIL. PERSPECTIVES 53, 57 (2004).
105
Cf. Christian Neuhäuser, Structural Injustice and the Distribution of Forward-Looking
Responsibility, 38 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 232, 246 (2014) (“[T]he motivation of agents to
embrace a forward-looking responsibility . . . depends on whether other actors
contribute their fair share, or at least are held accountable if they do not”).
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who are presently positioned to achieve it. Those whose life
experiences lead them to conclude that what they do matters—in light
of the money, voice and social influence they command—are dutybound to advance important moral interests when and how they can.
Other members of society, whose life experiences do not justify any
confidence that their actions will make a difference to collective
practices, need not be martyrs to the cause.
B. Equality as a Limiting Principle
The thrust of my argument has been against the Kantian method
of evaluating moral obligations and its disinterest in expected
consequences. One might question whether insisting instead that
actions be evaluated with an eye to their expected consequences
abandons Kant and deontological thinking completely.
It does not have to. The no-martyr principle is not justified on
utilitarian grounds: my argument has not been that these actions are
not required just because they do not improve welfare. I have been
largely silent on our reasons for recognizing some duties but not
others, including collective duties. But I have never assumed they were
utilitarian. For example, our duty to oppose an unjust regime is not
utilitarian, nor is the criteria by which we would identify an unjust
regime. Our duty to avert climate catastrophe might stand on a variety
of grounds, including the intergenerational or geographic distributive
consequences of global warming. Our reasons for recognizing various
collective moral imperatives depend on broader theories of justice that
I cannot sort through here—but I do not assume utilitarianism.
One might worry that even if the grounds for recognizing
collective duties are not utilitarian, I measure individual duties that
might derive from the collective duty only by way of their impact, that
is, in instrumental terms. But this is again an error. I have only argued
that there is a threshold question of whether one’s actions contribute
to fulfilling the collective duty at all. There is no implication that one
is obligated to do only what most efficiently advances that objective.
For example, I have argued that one’s actions in furtherance of the
collective purpose are constrained by the duty of fair play. Other
considerations might inform each person’s proportional contribution,
and one might need to do more than one’s fair share if others are
shirking—one’s actions in such scenarios are nevertheless effective
toward the common moral objective.
Even though the reasoning I suggest for the deliberating agent is
not utilitarian, there is still an important, related risk that my argument
does raise. Agent predictions, based as they often are on aggregate
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statistics and generalized claims about human nature, risk failing to
take seriously enough the individuality of agents. The individuality of
agents is closely related to their spontaneity, or the capacity of each
agent to choose her own course, which may or may not conform to
what we might predict about her based on superficial characteristics to
which we have access. Part of what entitles each agent to inviolable
respect is her capacity to act on reasons, and other agents never have
full access to the reasoning that will spur her to one action rather than
another. It is for this reason that we can never really know what others
are going to do any more than we could accept that, or even really
make sense of what it would mean for others to know what we ourselves
have yet to decide. Mutual uncertainty is a kind of mutual respect, and
this is part of what the Kantian approach aims to capture.106
Conceding that we can never truly know what any single person
will do, it is still permissible to make sound predictions, especially
about large numbers of people. Perhaps counterintuitively, it is
actually the more generalized predictions about what people will do
that are consistent with the principle of moral equality. Predictions
may be general in one of two senses: a prediction might concern
people in general (“people will (or will not) vote”). Thus, the state
may engage in some degree of monitoring of public streets and
inspection of motorists, pedestrians, and passengers on common
carriers on the grounds that “people commit crimes.”107 But it would
be impermissible for the state to target particular groups on the theory
that those groups are more likely to be dangerous, as if the state knows
the minds of the individuals that compromise those groups.108
A prediction about an individual’s future conduct might also
qualify as general if the prediction is based on an assumption that what
the speaker takes to be true of people in general (including the
speaker) is true of that individual (“she will lose her temper when
provoked”). Predictions about behavior depend on theories about
what motivates people. As we could never accept certainty by others
106

See supra Part II.A.
An interesting intermediate case includes predictions that crimes will occur at
particular times and places based on mass data processing. See Andrew Guthrie
Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259, 265 (2012)
(predictive policing “involves computer models that predict areas of future crime
locations from past crime statistics and other data.”).
108
See Benjamin Eidelson, Treating People as Individuals, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW (Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau eds.,
2013); Patrick S. Shin, Treatment as an Individual and the Priority of Persons over Groups in
Antidiscrimination Law, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 107 (2016).
107
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about what motivates us, we cannot purport to have certainty about
what anyone else will do either. Some reasons, however, for predicting
the actions of individuals do not depend on characterizing them in a
way that is inconsistent with our own self-understanding. Thus, it is
permissible to act on a prediction that your friend will break her
promise to meet you for dinner because she is stricken by grief at the
loss of her parent. Our prediction is based on an explanation that we
can project on to people in general, including ourselves. Whether we
think not showing up to dinner is a breach, or justified, or merely
excused, we know any one of us might skip a dinner out of grief. But
it is impermissible to assume your friend will break her promise and to
act accordingly (e.g., make alternative plans) because you consider her
particularly fickle.
To be incorporated into our practical reasoning, what we can
know about others must include what we know about ourselves. That
is, only predictions that are based on reasons that apply equally to all
people, including ourselves, are compatible with equal respect for our
respective capacities to choose and act. Taking the realities of human
cognition and moral frailty into account is not offensive because these
features of agents are universal.109 They are part of the circumstances
of justice in which we find ourselves and within which we must act.
Similarly, treating the announced intentions of an individual as
indicative of their future action is not disrespectful because we would
similarly wish our own announced intentions to be taken as indicative
of our own future actions. Even predictions about individuals that
extrapolate from a coherent narrative that the individual might herself
endorse are not disrespectful because they project continuity and
coherence that we tend to aspire to ourselves. The equality-based test
proposed here does not always generate clear answers to which
predictions are permissible, and this corresponds with moral intuitions
that the boundary is not bright. Nevertheless, the distinction between
general and specific predictions helps to explain why the general agent
predictions on which the no-martyr principle depends are permissible.
It is one thing to reason that people are not morally motivated
enough to take the risks that political protest often involves. It is
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Cf. Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics,
Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1375 (2004) (“Most of the time, our criminal law definitions and law
enforcement priorities emphasize the frailties of some and ignore the frailties of
others. But human frailty is pretty well distributed across race, class, and social
distinctions.”).
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another thing to predict that one demographic group will turn up or
not, or that a particular political leader will be responsive or not; the
latter predictions cannot excuse us from a duty to advance a collective
mandate. The agent predictions we may make are based on what we
know about agents in general, informed by the full expanse of our
highly particularized experiences. The predictions, like everything we
think, may be contingent in their derivation; but they are not specific
in their object. Legitimate agent predictions are based on what we
think we know about people, that is, what each of us believes we know
about all of us.
IV. VIRTUE AND JUSTICE UNDER THE NO-MARTYR PRINCIPLE
Christopher Kutz made an important point about how individuals
should decide what to do: if we decide in the shadow of others’
decisions, justice is a dim prospect.110 Just as prisoners in a prisoner’s
dilemma will arrive at a worse outcome for both prisoners if they ‘act
alone,’ so too will citizens consistently sustain injustice in small
scenarios and in their basic structure if we do not choose to act as we
would under a cooperative scheme, without worrying whether others
will abide by it. David Miller has similarly argued from the premise
that “it is morally intolerable if [remedial] suffering and deprivation
are allowed to continue, in other words that where they exist we are
morally bound to hold somebody . . . responsible for relieving
them.”111 If it is intolerable and someone must be responsible, and
there is no organized entity to blame, it is tempting to lay the
responsibility, if not the blame, at the feet of all the individuals that
could have cooperated to achieve a different result. And if they are to
be held responsible, the implication is not only that they carry
remedial obligations going forward, but also that they should have
acted differently to begin with.
There is a big difference between injustices in the basic structure
and other kinds of unfairness that are potentially remedied by an
organized collective. There is already an organized collective intended
to address the former category of injustice: the state. Thus, it is not
really the case that there is no alternative to unilateral action by
individuals, undertaken in blind hope of cooperation by third parties.
The state is in the first instance responsible for ensuring the justice of
110
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the basic structure. While its failures trickle down to the individuals
on whose behalf it acts, it is not cynical to look to the state as the agent
best positioned to coordinate individuals in their collective duties to
one another. The next Part will focus on state action as a solution to
moral collective action problems, like other collective action problems.
But I do not pretend that the state makes the problem go away. The
state does not solve all the problems it should. It must itself be moved
into action of one kind rather than another, and some unfairness that
can be characterized as injustice is not a plausible target of state action
at all. There are some kinds of unfairness flowing from social
institutions to which the state just has no solution, and there are other
kinds of ad hoc unfairness among particular people that practically can
be solved only by social cooperation outside of the state. So, while state
action goes a long way to ameliorate the tragedy of moral collective
action problems, there is plenty of that tragedy that persists even under
a just state.
In this Part, I make two separate points in response to this
observation. First, while I have argued that individuals have no duty to
act in furtherance of a collective plan if they predict with confidence
that it will not succeed, unilateral actions of this sort can still be
regarded as virtuous. Virtuous people do good, and if they are
plentiful, we can expect less injustice. Second, even though it remains
true that individual-level moral reasoning of the kind I have defended
here does not promote justice in the way that a more collectivist
attitude would; we cannot simply reason backward from what we want
our world to look like to determine what is required of each of us.
A. Virtue
One might mistake my view for a stronger one that denies that
there is any value in trying to promote justice when one cannot
succeed. However, a regular habit of trying to do what everyone should
do probably makes it more likely that one will comply with actual duties
to contribute to collective ends. Virtues can be understood as
cultivated strength of will that makes it more likely that one complies
with moral duties even when doing so entails sacrifice.112 For this
reason, we should regard as virtuous a proclivity to engage in even
futile action if intended in service of justice. Likely, the tendency at
work is not to engage in futile action per se but rather a cognitive
practice of declining to weigh the probability of success before
112
See Mary Gregor, Kant on Obligation, Rights and Virtue, 1 ANNUAL REV. L. & ETHICS
69, 95 (1993) (describing the Kantian conception of virtue).
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sacrificing for justice. Since we are bound to make mistakes in our
assessment of what is likely to result from our actions even if we
exercise appropriate caution in our predictions, those who skip that
step in moral deliberations are likely to do better (from a moral point
of view) in the long run. I refer here only to the step of assessing
whether one’s own contribution is likely to make a difference, not
assessing what kind of contribution is likely to make the best
contribution. These are separable analytically even though in practice
one can hardly think about one without the other. Failing to consider
which potential action is most likely to advance justice is a breach of
the duty to support justice. But choosing not to assign weight to the
other matter, of the odds of succeeding at what one has already
determined is the most promising course of action, is virtuous because
it effectively causes one to err always on the side of justice.
Even the less heroic among us tend to abandon calculations of
efficacy in the context of certain kinds of choices. For example, many
parents would run into a fire to save their child if that was the child’s
best chance without asking whether it was pointless, i.e., whether the
effort was too unlikely to succeed to qualify as compulsory. Most
parents are prepared to do a great deal more than what is required of
them. But what would be typical and perhaps an obligatory expression
of parental love for a child is a kind of heroic love of humanity that
would not be required with respect to a stranger. Outside of special
relationships, we are permitted to ask whether our actions will make a
difference; only the virtuous, having identified a course of action as
most likely to succeed, decline to consider further whether success is
probable.
Treating a tendency to promote justice without regard to efficacy
as a virtue is consistent with the idea that one has an imperfect duty to
promote morally valuable ends. In Kant’s usage of the concept, one
must over time act in a way that promotes a compulsory end even if
particular omissions cannot be regarded as immoral.113 Individuals’
acts in furtherance of the imperfect duty are virtuous. The duty to
support just institutions and the duty to promote justice generally may
not be imperfect in the way that Kant characterizes the duty of
beneficence. In some instances, the duty generates mandatory duties
to take specific steps in furtherance of justice. Nevertheless, we could
depart from Kant but borrow some of the framing to say that a person
who cultivates habits of action that make it more likely she will comply
113
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 153 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans.,
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with the duty of justice is virtuous in the same way that a person who
regularly acts on imperfect duty is virtuous. This allows us to
accommodate the strong intuition that acting without regard to
consequences for the sake of justice is not without moral worth, even
if, as I have argued, it is not compulsory. Because a minority of people
are virtuous in the way described, we can also be optimistic that there
will be some movement toward justice over time. Even the less
virtuous, who would not be motivated to act if they perceive no chance
of making a difference, are more likely to act because they know there
are virtuous people out there and they make it more likely that the
critical threshold for collective success will be met.
B. The Inadequacy of Individuals to the Collective Work of Justice
Supererogatory acts will never get us to justice. Do we need to
understand ourselves subject to a duty to promote justice irrespective
of others’ actions because we are otherwise doomed to pervasive
injustice? Such an argument from necessity would set the content of
our duties by reference to the common good. Kant’s categorical
imperative effectively operates this way.114 The original position in
Rawls’s theory of justice similarly asks what everyone would want the
principles of justice to be, assuming compliance.115
The Kantian position, but not the Rawlsian one, is at stake in the
question. It makes sense to ask by what principles people would agree
to be governed because the basic structure, as Rawls described it, is a
matter of political justice. It is inherently a collective question. It
necessarily seeks common ground among citizens of the political
community, and Rawls’s method achieves unanimity by stripping
people of characteristics that might create divergent preferences in the
original position.116 Rawls has taken a great deal of criticism for that
move.117 But while this reader of Rawls is sympathetic to the idea that
we can be asked to leave quite a bit when we arrive at the doorstep of
114
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political discourse—at least if we can expect similar anonymity by
others—asking individuals to set aside their particularities when they
deliberate about their individual courses of action is another matter
entirely. While we might arrive at and endorse principles of justice by
way of reason, those principles will ultimately regulate us through
institutions outside ourselves. Those principles do not constrain our
thought directly; they shape the circumstances in which we act.
Our duty to support those institutions, by contrast, is an individual
duty. The duty to support just institutions is probably the most
important of a family of duties to support justice that extends beyond
the political context. Virginia Held has argued individuals are bound
to cooperate with collectives that are subject to demands of justice,
both by following express plans and by taking steps that accord with a
salient solution.118 We may sometimes be obligated even to attempt
organization of groups that cannot otherwise meet the moral demands
on them.119 These duties that apply to individual action are very
different from duties that apply to groups, such as a political
community. Unlike the latter, individual moral duties must take up
space in our private deliberations about how to live.
The idea of “support” is not presented in Rawls as a maximalist
proposition. The right takes precedence over the good, but the idea
cannot be that we must radically prioritize the promotion of justice
over private projects or there could be no private projects. The
demands of justice would displace the life plans that are at the heart of
what Rawlsian justice aimed to protect. Supporting justice, whether in
the basic structure or in small spaces of public life, does not require
making the pursuit of justice the defining project of one’s life, though
some people might choose to devote themselves to it in that way given
their conceptions of the good life.
The way in which individual life projects relate to collective
projects depends on the relationships that individuals have with the
various groups to which they belong, including their political
communities. Those relations need not conform to any hierarchy
specified by principles of right; they are at the heart of what each
individual regards as good. Individuals identify with political
communities, social groups, and families to the extent those groups
factor into their lived experience in a positive way, and on the strength
of bonds individuals perceive with other group members. If there is
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no collective but only an aggregate of persons120 whose only
connection with one another is the potential to solve a problem,
individuals will not identify with that aggregate at all. But even where
the group to which moral demands apply is organized, individuals will
not usually conceive of themselves as the many hands of that group;
the group is often, but not always, conceived rather as an entity that
serves individuals, even if that service is a moral one.
People have identities and personal ambitions that they bring to
their reasoning about how to live. Some of them will indeed identify
closely with a community and will be optimistic about its potential to
redress injustice, in part because they are likely to project their own
associative feelings onto other group members. They might regard
themselves less as agents of the group and more as principals, the
people on whose behalf the group acts (even if not for their material
benefit). Of those who identify closely with a collective, we could also
say sometimes they feel ownership of it. Such associative feeling will
be borne of the life experiences of individuals in relation to the group;
it will rarely be generated by the moral necessity of cooperation in a
given instance. To be sure, moral necessity profits from such solidarity,
but it rarely spontaneously generates the feeling of solidarity absent
background conditions that attach group members to one another
already. Those for whom the collective is an essential element of the
self are most likely to play their part in fulfilling the moral imperatives
of the collective. Their feelings of solidarity are a fine reason for their
actions, but those feelings are not reasons rooted in principles of
justice and do not generate categorical duties for those lacking in such
feeling. Obligations of solidarity apply just in case someone identifies
with the group in question, like obligations of friendship apply only if
one identifies as a friend.
It is at odds with human experience to ask those who do not
identify with—or feel ownership of—a group, either because it is not
organized or because it has not played a formative role in the life of
the individual, to internalize the moral demands to which the group is
subject. Individuals will not adopt group projects where those projects
are ill-formed and unpromising, or where the group has not, over the
life of that individual, made itself indispensable to her own selfconception. In some ways, those who act on the collective demands on
120
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a group are the lucky ones: at least they take the group in question to
be truly their own. Fortunately, even those who do not identify closely
with one of the groups to which they belong may identify strongly with
one or more of the myriad other groups to which they belong. While
we are obligated to promote justice in all the groups to which we
belong, the pursuit of justice would be all-consuming if we were to
devote ourselves to the justice of each of these groups; there would be
little left. Again, this is not just a problem of demandingness as such.
Construing individual duty in service of collective justice as rigorously
as we might construe the obligations of a parent to a child—
unrelenting and indifferent to cost—treats individuals as the hands of
all the various groups in which she finds herself. In the liberal
tradition, we define justice in a way that it is attentive to and protective
of the life projects of individuals.
Nothing here rejects the role of solidarity in motivating individual
action that rises above moral collective action problems. But solidarity
must be real. It cannot be conjured up by the individual nor imposed
on her by obligation just because it is the best solution to a problem of
justice. For the same reasons that we are entitled to take into account
what we know about people, we have to start with people as we find
them in construing their moral obligations. Justice, at least on a liberal
view, is construed to serve and protect individuals, not the other way
around. This idea is often reflected in arguments that morality cannot
be conceived in terms that are excessively demanding on individuals.121
The constraint that we understand moral duties in a way that is
consistent with their subject is not merely a way of maximizing the
relevance of moral theory. It takes seriously the human agent as the
subject of moral rules. Our capacity for reason is no doubt one of our
most fundamental qualities, and it is the one around which Kant built
his theory. But we have other features that are fundamental to how
many people conceive of themselves qua agents—agents with
preferences and projects, beliefs, limitations, frailties, and
communities. When we reason about moral obligation, we must take
them as our starting point and not fashion our idea of the person, as
well as our proclivities and obligations, to serve antecedent conclusions
about what justice demands of us.
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V. THE ADVANTAGES OF PUBLIC LAW
We saw above that private law broadly respects the no-martyr
principle. In particular, defendants are usually only liable where they
have caused actual injury; it is not enough that a person failed to
comport with a standard of conduct. Moreover, in tort law, parties are
not usually held to optimal standards of conduct where individuals
were not already bound to conduct themselves in accord with such a
standard by virtue of social norms. Individuals are not held
responsible for having failed to behave as everyone should if others
have not yet been held to the same standard.
Public law holds everyone to the same standard. That, at least, is
its potential. Public law is the essential tool with which we solve moral
collective action problems. Its ex-ante character—rules generally
predate the conduct to which the rules are applied—accounts for most
of its advantages. Once conduct is subject to a mandatory rule,
individuals can expect full compliance, or at least compliance at rates
sufficient to require their own cooperation. The timing of public law
rules is related to other important features, such as its universal
character. That is, unlike marginal movement in the rules of private
law over the course of adjudicating disputes between two parties at a
time, public law rules are universally binding on everyone in the class
that a rule governs; they hit everyone at once. Finally, public law allows
agents to avoid an epistemic obstacle to navigating collective action
problems, namely, a single agent cannot distinguish apparent
noncompliance by other single agents from simple disagreement
about the upshot of applicable moral reasons. Promulgation of a rule
by a public authority solves this problem because it preempts first order
reasoning about conduct with an exclusionary reason that is uniform
for all.122 Private law, which can justify its ex-post nature only by
tracking the reasons that already applied to individuals, lacks the
capacity to solve the problem of moral uncertainty in this way.
A. Timing is Everything
Moral collective action problems, like all collective action
problems, are driven by uncertainty about the future. We do not know
what other people will do, so we make predictions based on what we
do know. Even if we are confident that moral demands on the group
can be met only if we each conform to some rule of conduct, we may
doubt that others will rise up to its demands. The most significant
122
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thing about a mandatory rule issued by the state is that it gives us just
the information we need when we need it. Once subject to a rule to
which others are similarly subject, we can know that others will
participate in the cooperative scheme that the state puts in place. We
do not have to worry about free-riding or futility. This works because
the public law rule is set out in advance of individual conduct to which
it applies.
Although people seem only to have this worry with respect to laws
that strike them as ‘unnecessary,’ one could in principle worry that
public law rules disrespect agents by implicitly expecting
noncompliance. After all, we would not need rules prohibiting
conduct if the state did not expect people to otherwise engage in that
conduct. We need not worry, though, because the realism about our
moral imperfection manifest in such laws is applied equally across all
subjects of the law.123 Even when the state issues rules that seem
unnecessary because most people are properly motivated to comply
anyway, the rule is not disrespectful of our agency if it is founded on
worries about people in general and the risks to which we are all
subject. For example, a law that requires parents to feed their children
might not do a lot of work, and we might bristle at the idea that the
state has something to say about this topic, or distrusts us so. But if the
state issues the rule in a general way, without attempting to predict who
will not feed their children, it does not disrespect citizens by virtue of
its prediction that some parents will fail to feed their children. It might
turn out that introducing the machinery of the state into some
relationships is a bad idea and the damage the state does when it flails
its arms in that space is not worth it. That is a contingent judgement
that will probably need a different answer in different times and places.
But at least the prediction about citizen behavior implicit in the rule is
not problematic.
The bare timing of public law rules also helps to foreshadow and
manage antisocial conduct that is only cumulatively consequential to
the collective practice. I have thus far focused on affirmative acts that
might be required of individuals in order to meet demands of
collective justice. But a lot of what is required of us is forbearance.
Consider the behavior of homeowners that put chairs or cones along
the street to prevent others from parking in front of their homes. A
norm that permits people to ‘appropriate’ public parking temporarily
when they have some immanent and special need, such as moving
123
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heavy furniture, would not seriously undermine the public interest in
making neighborhoods accessible to everyone. If the exception were
not abused often, people might assume, when they see a chair on the
street, that it was placed with good reason. But as increasing numbers
of people abuse the practice, the practice disintegrates, and one ends
up with unjustified extensions of private property into public space.
Public parking rules that clearly establish where people may park and
create some financial risk for rule-breakers make it actually easier to
accept the occasional violation without prompting copycat behavior.
The public rules increase our expectation that the violation at hand is
justified and our confidence that it will not contribute to a spiral of
parking mayhem of which we might as well be part.
Of course, there are plenty of duties we can recognize between
individuals in private law. There is no claim here that private law is
generally inept at regulating misconduct. But because it operates one
dispute at a time, and after the fact, it cannot motivate a solution to
moral collective action problems without making martyrs of particular
defendants—that is, without holding them responsible for injuries
they were not in a position to prevent acting alone.
A second virtue of public law, universality, is closely related to the
matter of timing. Because public law rules are issued in advance of the
conduct they regulate, they usually apply to many potential subjects of
the law. When we suspect that a rule was not merely ‘inspired’ by but
intended to benefit or target a particular citizen or corporation, the
rule is regarded as less legitimate as a result. Rules developed through
adjudication tend to evolve one small step at a time; the small
extensions of existing rules are intended to be modest, not sweeping
in their coverage. While this makes sense for judge-made law that is
applied after the fact to a particular defendant, such a method raises
the problem of unfair treatment discussed in Part III. By contrast, most
public law rules aim to apply broadly. It means that individuals subject
to those rules can rest assured that—to the extent there is equality
before the law—the rules of collective living that are intended to
promote justice and the common good constrain everyone. To be
sure, the formal fact of universal application does not ensure that
public law is equally burdensome for all, or that everyone contributes
equally to moral demands on the collective. Those who suspect they
are being shafted will probably regard the legal system as failing its task
of solving moral collective action problems because the law is not
designed to ensure equal contributions. But while public law is not
necessarily universal in the substantive sense that is of ultimate moral
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interest, universality of the constraints it imposes is usually a sine qua
non of its perceived legitimacy.
That everyone is equally subject to a mandatory rule of public law,
as compared to an inchoate moral duty to advance a matter of public
justice, has a secondary benefit. When we rely on moral duties at the
individual level, the costs of promoting and achieving justice fall on
those with moral clarity. Victims of systemic oppression may see
injustice as ubiquitous. The imperative to respond to injustice will
infuse every aspect of their lives. By contrast, those who see injustice
in discrete places in the social structure will be more lightly burdened.
Such a dynamic is perverse. When the state mediates competing
assessments of its mandate through democratic institutions and then
issues mandatory rules that reflect compromise, those rules apply to
everyone equally, whether they appreciate the moral interests served
by those rules or not.
The final and most important virtue of a mandatory rule literally
preempts the other benefits of timing. One of the reasons we might
hesitate as agents to predict or assess the actions of others is the
phenomenon of disagreement. When we observe noncompliance with
what we understand rightful conduct to be, how do we know whether
other people are choosing to flout what they believe to be their
obligation—withholding
cooperation
because
they
expect
noncooperation from others, or simply disagreeing with us about what
justice requires from us all?124 The timing and generality of public law
rules helps us to eliminate the problem of noncompliance in
anticipation of the noncompliance of others. The procedural
pedigree of public law rules allows us to manage the problem of
disagreement.
Promulgation of a rule by a public authority preempts first-order
reasoning about conduct with an exclusionary reason that is uniform
for all.125 Public law produces its own agreement on the upshot of
applicable reasons by making practically irrelevant the kinds of reasons
on which we disagree. Absent a mandatory rule, per the discussion in
Part III, a primary duty that is borne by the collective gives rise to
derivative duties of reciprocity and free play by individuals. Once a
mandatory rule is in place, the hierarchy is reversed. Individuals face
124
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a straightforward duty to abide by the authoritative directives of a
legitimate state. What would be a primary duty of justice that applied
to the group now undergirds the individual duty to defer to the state.
We might think in Razian terms that the duty of justice that applies to
the group and the moral collective action problem that impedes
decentralized fulfillment of that collective duty together make it the
case that we will do better abiding by authority than by flouting it.126
But the basic point does not depend on a particular jurisprudential
view like the service conception of authority.127 As long as it is the case
that individuals will obey mandatory legal rules, those rules achieve just
the coordinated action we need, and we in turn are relieved of
epistemic doubts about the motivations of others. Disagreement about
how we should collectively comply with the demands of justice is
channeled into public discourse about how the state should direct
individual action going forward, instead of an opaque, real-time process
of mutual response in the realm of conduct, as the tragedy of
noncooperation plays out.
B. What We Could Do Differently
Moral collective actions problems at first blush might seem exotic
and unlikely. How often is it really the case that we cannot make a
difference to justice? Most people already prefer mandatory rules with
respect to cases of large-scale coordination, as with carbon pollution,
for example. I argued in Part II, however, that the small possibility of
making a difference, or the possibility of making only a very small
difference, does not do away with the basic tragedy of a moral collective
action problem. If the basic framework sheds light on imperfect cases,
we can learn from it in how we handle a wide variety of public policy
matters. I name just a few here by way of example.
One context in which it is typical to appeal to conscience in public
discourse is the matter of corporate social responsibility. Observers
often call on corporations to do better by their employees or the
environment. Some are optimistic that we can achieve accountability
through market measures that allow investors or consumers to punish
irresponsible corporations. Not all corporations are susceptible to
those influences, and it is hard to imagine major social change coming
about through ad hoc pressure that appeals to the conscience of
126
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corporate agents. One might argue that many instances of alleged
corporate irresponsibility are not part of any collective action problem
because each corporation is in a position to make a difference by
unilateral action. If, however, we take most corporations to be subject
to competitive pressures, any costly actions in service of corporate
responsibility will disadvantage that corporation to its detriment. In
the long run, to the extent profitability goes down or prices go up, we
can expect its investors and consumers to flee, respectively. While most
can probably do something useful, it is not clear that many corporations
have as much room for unilateral action as would be necessary to bring
about substantial change in the vulnerability of even those specific
populations dependent on them. My argument here suggests that we
might expend less energy exhorting corporations to behave well and
invest political resources in mandatory rules. While the corporate
social responsibility movement is of course a response to the obstacles
to public law reform, nothing short of public law is likely to be
successful. Asking companies to behave virtuously is so at odds with
their social construction as engines of profit for their constituents and
users that it is an unpromising alternative.
My subsequent examples are from the realm of contract. Many
commentators are critical of nondisclosure agreements, and there is
some cynicism about the people who sign them in exchange for
significant sums of money.128 My discussion here gives us reason to
doubt that anyone is required to forego that money in service of justice
that she is unlikely to see. As long as nondisclosure agreements are
valid and enforceable, each prospective signer can expect that others
similarly situated will be offered similar deals and most of them will
sign too. It is not reasonable to expect people to turn their lives upside
down publicizing horrible facts when there is little prospect of
reforming their organization, let alone society, because others similarly
situated will not come forward. I doubt that it is appropriate to ask
people, usually women, to forego material compensation for their
silence in the service of bringing justice to those who do wrong. But if
we think that the optimal rule is disclosure, rather than nondisclosure,
then there should be a rule prohibiting nondisclosure agreements.
Until then, those who sign them have done no wrong.
People sign other agreements with adverse social consequences.
For example, we all routinely sign waivers of liability that make it
128
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possible for businesses to operate less carefully than might be socially
desirable. But it makes no sense for any one of us to protest because
there is no chance that the business will adopt a new policy on account
of a few troublesome people.129 We each understand that the
individual calculation usually cuts in favor of signing because the odds
of injury are sufficiently low in the individual case. Likewise, we sign
away our right to sue without much worry because we have no desire
to sue in any but the most exceptional circumstances.130 Surely it is not
incumbent on the individual to strike out against the evisceration of
public law by declining the benefits of such an agreement; it is up to
public law to manage the effects of private agreement, including their
enforceability. In other contexts, we agree to transfer intellectual
property that is useless to us to an entity that will provide us a useful
service at no other cost. The concentration of intellectual property in
the hands of a few entities might be regarded as incompatible with a
free society in the long run.131 But again, is the individual really
supposed to forego the value of the software in order to shout her
worries into the dark? My argument here has been that so much
cannot be demanded of individuals. Mandatory rules issued by a
public authority are necessary to solve these and other moral collective
action problems.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have argued that individuals are not required to take futile
action in furtherance of collective justice, even if they must rely on
what I have called “agent predictions” to describe a proposed action as
futile. Not all agent predictions afford fellow agents equal respect. But
because people are material beings whose contingent environments
are essential to our self-understanding, we can take into account the
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reality in which our choices are made, including what we each have
learned about what people are like and what they tend to do.
Moral collective action problems, like collective action problems
in general, have a clear solution: state action. Institutional solutions to
collective action problems make cooperation rational at the individual
level.132 Similarly, it takes public law to make morally compulsory the
individuals acts necessary to achieve collective justice.133 I regard this
point as complementary to the Kantian thesis that justice is not
possible outside of the state.134 My view might at first blush have
appeared hyper-individualistic or simply selfish; it might have seemed
almost lazy for taking aim at the kinds of duties that make life hard.
Instead, by showing the limits of individual obligation that is derivative
from collective duty, I have placed the state—and in particular, public
law—at the center of our collective moral life. Just as the limited reach
of state institutions sometimes requires individuals to do more than is
legally required of them,135 the limits of individual moral reasoning
demand state action to achieve justice. I have suggested that
mandatory rules issued by a public authority are the most promising
solution to a variety of moral collective action problems. My discussion
is intended to leave us pessimistic about the prospects for spontaneous
collaboration in service of justice but optimistic about our capacity to
make progress through law. The critical role of the state in solving
these problems is one of the reasons that the state itself is morally
compulsory, as Kant argued.136 However demanding Kant was on the
individual moral agent, he was not very optimistic about her. He too
ultimately looked to the state for justice.

132

See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
133
See IRIS MARION YOUNG, RESPONSIBILITY FOR JUSTICE 69 (2011) (“institutions are a
necessary means for promoting justice…For the promotion of justice requires collective
action, and that requires organization.”).
134
KANT, supra note 113, at 121–22; see also Helga Varden, Kant’s Non-Voluntarist
Conception of Political Obligations: Why Justice is Impossible in the State of Nature, 13 KANTIAN
REV. 1 (2008); Jeremy Waldron, Kant’s Legal Positivism, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1535 (1996).
135
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
136
See supra note 134.

